Populism and central bank independence by Goodhart, Charles & Lastra, Rosa
  
Charles Goodhart, Rosa Lastra 
Populism and central bank independence 
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
Original citation: 
Goodhart, Charles and Lastra, Rosa (2017) Populism and central bank independence. Open 
Economies Review. ISSN 0923-7992 
 
DOI: 10.1007/s11079-017-9447-y 
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2017 The Authors 
CC BY 4.0 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85159/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL 
(http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
 
 
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Populism and Central Bank Independence
Charles Goodhart1 & Rosa Lastra2
# The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication
Abstract The consensus that surrounded the granting of central bank independence in
the pursuit of a price stability oriented monetary policy has been challenged in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis, in the light of the rise of populism on the one
hand and the expanded mandates of central banks on the other hand. After considering
the economic case for independence and the three Ds (distributional, directional and
duration effects), the paper examines three different dimensions in the debate of how
the rise in populism - or simply general discontent with the status quo - affects central
bank independence. Finally, the paper examines how to interpret the legality of central
bank mandates, and whether or not central banks have exceeded their powers. This
analysis leads us in turn to consider accountability and, in particular, the judicial review
of central bank actions and decisions. It is important to have in place adequate
mechanisms to ‘guard the guardians’ of monetary and financial stability.
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1 Introduction
Populism has been in the ascendant in the US, the UK and other European countries, from
Poland and Hungary to Turkey. The rise in populism, we argue, has dented the consensus
that surrounded the support for central bank independence from the late 1980s to 2008.
The word ‘populism’ has tended to become a generalised, pejorative term of abuse
applied to any political party of the (extreme) right, or left, that does not share the main
economic tenets of the liberal, central establishment. But in one of its various, and
changing, definitions, e.g. that of Ba political or social programme, cause, etc., appeal-
ing to the mass of the people^,2 all current political parties are ‘populist’.
For the purpose of this paper, however, we would tend to define ‘populism’ as
involving a major disagreement with the central liberal tenet that allowing the free
movement of labour, capital and goods and services between nations would be both
generally beneficial and desirable in almost all circumstances. Thus, we would define a
populist as one wanting to restrict the movements of people, capital, and goods and
services between nation states.
We would also suggest a subsidiary definition; this being that a populist, once
having been democratically elected, would be a politician who would then seek to
remove the checks and balances, generally applied in a democratic state, in order to
achieve the objectives upon which he (or she) was originally elected; in other words, an
elected politician who then seeks autocratic powers.
Thus, our definition comprises two parts, the first being the control of the movement
of factors of production and products across national borders, and the second being a
desire to achieve autocratic control over all executive powers of government, once
having initially been democratically elected.
Populism has thrived in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, since anti-
globalization movements, emboldened by the ‘will of the people’, have challenged
the traditional political landscape. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract theory
argued that sovereignty arose from the people, not from the monarch. The individuals
are the principal sovereignty-holders and they assemble or aggregate their individual
wills into a unity: a general or collective will (‘the will of the people’). The holder or
bearer of such collective will (to whom individuals transfer their private will for the
conduct of certain affairs) is the state, and its decisions require the agreement of the
original sovereignty-holders. This is the basis of democratic legitimacy.3
2 The Economic Issues
Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality and many others since (Thomas Piketty’s
BCapital in the Twenty-first century^ being a significant contemporary contri-
bution (Piketty 2014)) emphasize how wealth and income inequality feed
popular discontent (Rousseau 2010). Those that feel disenchanted, with little
to lose, will vote, rebel or protest against the ‘political establishment’. There
is a widespread feeling that the skilled jobs in manufacturing, and elsewhere,
2 The Chambers Dictionary (2006).
3 Lastra (2015).
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have been lost, outsourced to China or overtaken by robots. Even where
alternative jobs become available, these are often, relatively unskilled, ‘gig’
jobs in the service economy, with low pay and competition from immigrants.
Not only have median wages for ‘blue-collar’ workers stagnated over the last
few decades, but also such workers, and their families, feel often that they have
lost respect. In particular, many of them feel that the liberal elite in the centre-
left parties (Democrats in the USA, Labour in the UK), have put concern for
ethnic minorities and the extension of foreign aid, globalisation and free trade
above local working-class interests.4
Against this socio-economic background, populist leaders have pledged to reverse
the above set of policies in a way that they claim will bring economic benefits and
faster growth to the less-educated and poorer segments of the community. Indeed, in the
case of President Trump the fiscal arithmetic will only add up if growth does rise from
(slightly under) 2% per annum to (somewhat) over 3% per annum.
Meanwhile the economic case for Central Bank independence (CBI) was largely
predicated on the belief of a vertical Phillips curve, i.e. that at some ‘natural rate’ of
unemployment, (given by forces such as productivity, the strength of unionized
bargaining, etc.), inflation would tend to remain constant; push, (spare capacity), below
this natural rate and inflation would continuously accelerate, while above the NAIRU
deflation would take hold and deepen. When, e.g. in the 1950s, most economists
believed in a downwards sloping Phillips curve, i.e. that you could trade off more
(less) inflation against less (more) unemployment (UE) and more (less) growth, exactly
where one should try to position oneself on the downwards sloping Phillips curve was,
rightly, seen as essentially a political decision.
The concept of the vertical Phillips curve radically changed views. If, in the medium
and longer term, an economy could not grow faster by accepting a somewhat higher
rate of inflation, then the optimal monetary policies must be to maintain price stability,
which indeed would support growth, by removing certain distortions arising from high
and uncertain inflation.
The empirical basis for continuing belief in the vertical Phillips curve has, however,
weakened. Over the last two decades, or so, levels of unemployment (the pressure of
demand) have varied widely, but inflation has remained fairly stable, near 2%. The
actual, empirical Phillips curve has become closer to horizontal than to vertical. While
this is no doubt largely due to the success of central banks in maintaining their inflation
targets, and public expectations thereof, it does raise questions whether the inflationary
consequences of seeking to run the economy at a higher pressure of demand, at any rate
for a time, would necessarily be so bad; indeed, Janet Yellen of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System raised just such an issue in a speech in 2016.5 What we
see lying ahead is a clash between central banks, concerned for their price stability
mandate, as unemployment falls below the assessed ‘natural’ rate, and populist politi-
cians committed to achieving faster growth, especially of real wages. In the Eurozone
(and perhaps Japan) the conflict will be somewhat different; the concern will arise more
from the impact of higher interest rates (to restrain inflation) on the fiscal position of the
more indebted member states.
4 Goodhart (2017) and Vance (2016). On globalization and populism, see Rodrik (2017).
5 Yellen (2016). The quote relates to her musing about a temporary ‘high-pressure economy’.
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Giving central banks independence, with a mandate to achieve price stability, has
depended on a belief, and circumstances, that, first, was viewed as separating the
achievement of price stability from concerns over growth and unemployment (i.e. the
vertical Phillips curve); and, second, was conditional on (public sector) debt ratios
being low enough to absorb the fiscal effect of higher interest rates. Both supporting
conditions have weakened. So, CBI may become increasingly at risk over the next few
decades for underlying economic reasons.
But with monetary policy being expansionary at a time of sluggish growth and near-
zero inflation, one might have expected little criticism of central bank policy. Indeed,
given that they have often appeared to be ‘the only game in town’,6 one might have
expected praise, combined with more criticism of the fiscal authorities.7 But that has not
generally been the case.
Some of the brickbats flung at central banks have related to the slow tempo of the
recovery; others to the possibility that one aspect of the unconventional measures, i.e.
negative nominal interest rates may have had a counter-productive effect, e.g. by
weakening commercial bank profitability. Perhaps the main general criticism is that
the unprecedented low level of nominal and real interest rates has been stimulating
over-borrowing, a debt over-hang, which may encourage present expenditures, but at
the expense of future fragility and potential crises, i.e. borrowing from the future. But
the main reasons for such attacks have related to distributional and directional effects.
Distributional effects have always happened as a result of changes in interest rates
(e.g., between creditors and debtors). But Quantitative Easing (QE) and
Unconventional Monetary Policies (UMPs) are now seen in the context of the winners
and losers of globalization. One reason may be that the trends in nominal and real
interest rates over the last three decades have been so large and persistent. Earlier it was
probably believed that there would be swings and roundabouts, but that inflation, and
both nominal and real interest rates, would fluctuate around a norm; so, temporary
benefits to one side, or the other, would in the longer run wash out. This has not
happened over the last three decades. While central banks claim, with justification, that
the effects of their expansionary policies have not worsened, and may have improved,
income inequality, their detractors have responded by claiming that such policies will
have worsened wealth inequality, particularly between that section of the young whose
parents can help them onto the housing ladder, and the remaining section who can get
no such help.
Directional effects relate to QE and asset purchases having an impact on some
particular sectors of the economy, e.g. on the housing market, via purchases of
mortgage-related securities. But the argument that central banks should only purchase
(safe) government debt is historically naïve. Until the 1930s, under the Real Bills
doctrine, the argument was reversed; until then it was the short-term bills of exchange
6 El-Erian (2016).
7 BThere is a misleading, but commonly used, phrase about some Central Bank operations having ‘quasi-
fiscal’ effects. All Central Bank operations on their balance sheet, and to affect the level and pattern of interest
rates, have fiscal implications, perhaps especially the most traditional open market operations in Treasury Bills
to adjust the official short-term interest rate. But there is now, following on from the post-Global Financial
Crisis (GFC) allocation of responsibility for financial stability, and for the manipulation of micro and macro-
prudential instruments, a far wider allocation of non-traditional operational functions to Central Banks. It has
been akin to the opening of Pandora’s Box.^ See Goodhart and Lastra (2015).
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of trade and industry that should be the preferred instrument, not government debt.
Oddly enough, if directional effects are held to be within the political province, there
was no widespread suggestion that the CB should decide on the quantum of base
money to be injected into the economy, and then pass it on to an intermediary, staffed
and controlled by the politicians and the Ministry of Finance, who would then decide
on whom the recipients should be.
There is, furthermore, yet another D effect, Duration, which has so far not figured
much in discussion of central bank policies, but where we expect the discussion to
become sharper. QE has drastically been reducing the duration of the consolidated
public sector debt, including the CB within the public sector, just at a time when debt
management precepts would have suggested that a country would have been well
advised to lengthen the duration of its public-sector debt, to take advantage of extraor-
dinarily low interest rates. As interest rates start rising, and the CB has to start paying
out great wads of money to the banks holding massively expanded balances with
themselves, this latter criticism may become much more vocal.
Of the three Ds, Distribution, Direction and Duration, we expect concerns about the
first two to slacken as policy becomes re-normalised, but objections to the third to
grow. Imagine the populist outcry as rising nominal rates not only slow growth and
employment and raise mortgage costs, but also seem primarily to benefit the cash-flow
of banks via interest paid on massively expanded reserves at the central bank!
3 Democracy and Legitimacy
It is important to draw a demarcation line between politics and electoral agendas (a
changing ‘game’) and the foundations which underpin our democratic systems (a
minimum common denominator for the different parties across the political spectrum).
A democracy is based upon a system of checks and balances (division of powers) and
respect for the rule of law. It requires independence of the judiciary for it to work, as
well as free elections and recognition of certain freedoms and human rights.
To present some of the traditional bastions of democracy, in particular the judiciary
and the ‘nonconforming’ media (free speech), as ‘enemies’ of the people opens a
slippery slope. Attacks on the judiciary – questioning their impartiality – are attacks on
the rule of law. There is always a danger in popular mandates that override every other
check and balance. History provides a powerful warning against the emergence of
regimes where dissent is not permitted or where those who oppose the regime are
vilified or threatened (Wolf 2017a, b).8
8 As Wolf writes: B(…) Robespierre, Lenin, Hitler and Mao all applied variants of this phrase [enemies of the
people]^. See FT, 7 March 2017, Britain plays with fire over Brexit. In the context of the approval of the EU
(notification of withdrawal) Bill, Liberal Democrat Lord Taverne attacked that ‘a dangerous step’ towards the
doctrine that Bthe people’s will must always prevail^. That, he said, was the doctrine favoured by Hitler,
Mussolini and Stalin. Wolf in another article BThe economic origins of the populist surge^ (FT, 28 June 2017)
states: ‘Populists distrust institutions, especially those that constrain the Bwill of the people^, such as courts,
independent media, the bureaucracy and fiscal or monetary rules. Populists reject credentialed experts. They
are also suspicious of free markets and free trade. (…) [T]he financial crisis opened the door to a populist
surge^.
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Moving from these important constitutional and philosophical matters to the theme
of our paper, we can identify at least three dimensions in the debate of how the rise in
populism - or simply general discontent with the status quo - affects central bank
independence.
First, the dimension of legitimacy. Legitimacy pre-exists and is a requisite of
accountability. Legitimacy in turn is rooted in the concept of sovereignty.9 There are
two aspects to legitimacy: formal and societal.10 According to the former, the creation
of an independent central bank must be the fruit of a democratic act: an act of the
legislator, a constitutional decision or a treaty provision (non-democratic regimes also
have a notion of formal legitimacy embedded in their systems). ‘Societal’ legitimacy
refers to the support by the public, and is determined by the acceptance of, or loyalty to,
the system. Of course, societal legitimacy can be fickle since public acceptance is also
influenced by politics, the media, current events, changes in circumstances, sentiment,
and other factors. In any case, when societal legitimacy weakens or is no longer
present, the law is bound to change.
Any democratic regime can alter the mandate of the central bank following the
required normative procedure (a statute for example can always be replaced by another
statute; Constitutions and Treaties are more difficult to revise, but they are not immutable).
While the initial legal basis ‘legitimizes’ the establishment of the independent central
bank, it cannot by itself legitimize on an ongoing basis the exercise of the powers
delegated to such agency. It is then in the continuing life of that entity that account-
ability becomes necessary to ensure legitimacy. An accountable central bank must give
account, explain and justify the actions or decisions taken, against criteria of some kind,
and take responsibility for any fault or damage.
Compared with other government agencies, central banks are very powerful entities
since they are guardians of monetary stability (and financial stability) and dictate price
levels, influencing the level of risk-taking in the economy.11 Central banks’ monetary
policies also have important redistributive effects. That is why accountability is of the
essence.
Central banks are not majoritarian, democratic institutions. Central banks are,
instead, technocratic bureaucracies, staffed by career employees and, typically, a
few leaders elected by the political authorities. It might be said that any bureau-
cratic agency is non-majoritarian…But the problem is greatly exacerbated in the
case of central banks as compared with typical bureaucracies. Central banks do
not simply administer a technical regulatory scheme affecting discrete industries
or interests. They regulate price levels, which is one of the most fundamental
powers of government, and one of the most important practical concerns of the
public at large.12
9 The attributes of sovereignty are not fixed. As Jackson (2003) noted in his seminal contribution - -
sovereignty moves through a ‘vertical ladder’ and ‘horizontally’ from, and through, different power bases.
10 See Lastra, above note 4, pp. 84–85, and Verhoeven (2002).
11 See C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others vs Deutscher Bundestag [2014] OJ C129/11, paragraph 110:
BMoreover, the conduct of monetary policy will always entail an impact on interest rates and bank refinancing
conditions, which necessarily has consequences for the financing conditions of the public deficit of the
Member States^.
12 Lastra and Miller (2001).
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Secondly, themandate. The agreement on the goal (price stability and/or financial stability)
provides the justification for CBI, given the ‘instrumental’ nature of independence.
Independence is an instrument to achieve a goal or set of goals. The importance of the
goal is therefore the key consideration in designing an adequate legal framework for its
pursuit. Some German commentators referred to the arrangement that governed the
Bundesbank - namely a price stability oriented monetary policy conducted by an inde-
pendent central bank - as a constitutive element of ‘Ordnungspolitik’, of the economic and
political order that should be a common denominator accepted by different political parties.
Questioning the goal also leads to questioning specific central bank policies, actions
or decisions taken to achieve such goal/s, for example QE and other unconventional
instruments of monetary policy.
When a central bank has several goals, for example, the US Federal Reserve System,
the central bank can change policies more easily than when a central bank has a
narrowly defined goal, as is the case of the European Central Bank or before 1999 of
the Bundesbank. The existence of several unranked objectives - or an unspecific
mandate - complicates the exercise of performance accountability.
With expanded mandates, central banks require new mechanisms of accountability
(Balls et al. 2016).13 This has been the subject of much debate given the significant role
that central banks have acquired as crisis managers, macro-prudential and micro-
prudential supervisors and, in some cases, as resolution authorities. Lord Acton’s dictum
lurks in the background. Accountability remains first and foremost a mechanism to
prevent the abuse of power.
As the mandate has become fuzzier, broader and more complicated – with uncon-
ventional monetary policies and the renewed emphasis on financial stability – the
consensus which surrounds the goal/s crumbles and with it the importance of indepen-
dence diminishes (Khan 2017).14 The delegation of macro-prudential supervision and
financial stability to the central bank could become more problematical than inflation
targetry, because it is so much harder to monitor, and you cannot really tell whether the
authorities are on the right track, or not. It is remarkable: (1) that almost all of the
criticism of CBs relates to their monetary policy actions, rather than giving them extra
powers to achieve financial stability, and (2) that CBs have also been the ‘only game in
town’,15 so one might have expected that public concern with inactivity in fiscal policy
and supply side measures to have been more vocal, whereas the criticism seems to be
focussed on the only institution trying to do much. Moreover, an independent central
bank – as a specialised technocratic agency – operating without electoral or partisan
13 Balls et al. (2016) advocate the preservation of operational independence, while sacrificing a certain degree
of political independence for the sake of legitimacy and accountability. See Balls et al. (2016).
14 As noted by Münchau, writing in the FT, 20 February 2017, ‘Central bank independence losing its lustre’):
BOnce the consensus about the goals of monetary policy breaks down, the notion of central bank independence
becomes harder to defend on democratic grounds^.
In the case of the ECB the mandate has not been amended (there is a clear hierarchy that has been preserved
intact) and the tension comes from the expectations of the citizens, that want more from the central banks.
In a recent IMF Working Paper (WP/17/101), entitled BCentral Bank Legal Frameworks in the Aftermath of
the Global Financial Crisis^, Khan examines the central banks in a selected number of jurisdictions (the only
EU country included is France) and it is rather surprising to see in page 28 how little difference there is de iure
before and after the 2014 update. His analysis however does not include the US, the UK and the EU generally,
where major legal changes have taken place following the crisis.
15 Above note 6.
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influences or constraints can do a better job at preserving monetary and financial
stability than a political authority that seeks re-election and is thus subject to time
inconsistency problems.
Paul Tucker has explored the challenges to CBI and the contours of macroprudential
policy in a recent paper (Tucker 2017).16 He urges ‘the central banking community not
to become too powerful’ and suggests that stability policy should focus on a ‘standard
of resilience’ (tolerance to crisis) rather than ‘managing the credit cycle’. It would be
interesting to see whether some composite rating (akin to CAMEL for micro prudential
supervision in the US) could be developed for financial stability purposes - indepen-
dently from the central bank - and such a rating could then be applied as a standard of
resilience. He differentiates between ‘regulatory policy’ (which is open to challenge in
courts) and ‘balance sheet policy’ (which is less likely to be challenged in courts but
may expose the state to fiscal risks). He warns central banks about becoming ‘over-
mighty citizens’ and points out that the heavy lifting of sustainable economic recovery
is in the hands of governments (not central banks), since only they can remove
obstacles to greater dynamism in the supply side of the economy.
Vitor Constâncio has also considered the contours of macro-prudential policy
(Constâncio 2017), 17 suggesting a further expansion of the ‘boundaries’ of
macroprudential policy beyond the banking sector and into the shadow banking system.
While this approach is a reflection of the changing nature of financial markets it also
posits the question of where to draw the boundaries.18
The question of excessive reach, that is whether central banks have abrogated to
themselves powers which are not in the mandate, and the legal interpretation of whether
a central bank is abiding by the mandate or exceeding its powers, are fundamental
issues in a democratic system.
What is clear is that if the mandate gets overstretched the balance between inde-
pendence and accountability should tilt towards accountability. This can take many
forms: additional disclosure requirements, further parliamentary oversight and judicial
scrutiny. And ultimately a change in the law – reflecting the expanded mandate –might
be the right course of action in a democracy, since any expansive interpretation of
delegated central bank powers within a given legal structure should be limited in time.
Thirdly, the dimension of personnel (‘central bankers’). Explicit or implicit attacks
on central bankers can provide ammunition to politicians in front of their constituencies
and/or in front of the electorate at large. If central bankers (those at the helm of their
institution in particular) are perceived as critical of the government in power or if their
policies are – rightly or wrongly – blamed as being a constitutive part of the popular
discontent that propelled populism or a change of government in the first place, they
will be criticised. In the current political and economic climate, it has become expedient
to blame those – banks, financiers and also central banks – who are partially held
responsible for the crisis and for the loss of living standards of a large segment of the
population and who appear to remain largely unpunished. We should however beware
16 Tucker (2017).
17 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/ecb.sp170511.en.html.
18 We have discussed the boundary problem in Goodhart and Lastra (2010) and The Interaction between
Monetary Policy and Banking Regulation, above note 7.
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of turning central bankers into scapegoats and of unduly restricting the flexibility
needed to be able to access the best pool of talent (Giugliano 2015a, b).19
Appointment and dismissal procedures are important indicators of legal and de facto
central bank independence. 20 A ‘pluralistic’ appointment procedure aims to avoid
politicization. By pluralistic we mean ‘diversified’ membership of the central bank
governing bodies, bringing different views to the conduct of central banking tasks,
based upon region, gender, sector and/or expertise. In a geographically decentralized
structure of government (such as a federal country), membership on the basis of region
is important so as to represent the various interests of various parts of the country (or
Union, as in the case of the EU). Indeed, in the case of the ECB, the key positions in the
Executive Board, in particular the post of President, should not be tainted by political
meddling or positioning of ‘key Member States’.
Membership based upon sector refers to the inclusion of the various sectors of the
economy: industry, commerce, agriculture. For instance, in the USA, the Federal
Reserve Banks have a Board of Directors with nine members each (and the president
of each Federal Reserve Bank must be a person of ‘tested banking experience’). Of
those nine members, three members are known as Class A Directors, who are required
to be representatives of the member banks, and may themselves be bankers. Three
others are designated as Class B Directors, and must represent industry, commerce, and
agriculture in the district and must not be officers, directors, or employees of any bank.
The remaining three comprise the Class C Directors and are appointed by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In the UK, the main criterion for member-
ship of the Monetary Policy Committee is expertise in either monetary policy, financial
markets, or the running of the economy in general (at the macro or micro level). The
ESCB combines a geographic criterion (because of the composition of the European
Central Bank and the national central banks) and criteria based on expertise (the
members of the Executive Board must be selected among ‘persons of recognized
standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters’).
Another recommendation is for ‘professional independence’, which is enhanced by
the appointment of qualified candidates, well versed in monetary economics and central
banking theory and practice. Professional independence is also safeguarded by the
establishment of a list of incompatible or disqualifying activities so as to prevent
conflicts of interest. For instance, while in office central bankers should be precluded
from simultaneously holding private-sector jobs. Central bank officials should perform
their duties on a full-time basis (with the possible exception of academic/university
engagements). A central banker should not be simultaneously a financial adviser, an
employee or a shareholder of a bank, or a member of parliament, as those occupations
would engender conflicts of interests. Central bank officials should also be limited in
pursuing private employment in credit and financial institutions for a reasonable period
following their term of office. These restrictions are designed to preclude their
19 Giugliano (2015a) Central banks face tricky balancing act, Financial Times, 4 August and Giugliano
(2015b) Central Banks: Peak Independence, 8 November.
20 See pp. 32–35 of Lastra (1996) below note 35, and pp. 70–71 of Lastra (2015), above note 3. In a recent
paper Cargill (2016) argues that de facto independence is generally less than de iure independence, primarily
because of politicians’ control of appointments and ability to place pressure on central banks. While there
might be some validity in his position, the argument– focusing mainly on the experience of the Federal
Reserve System – could have been developed further.
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susceptibility to ‘private’ incentives while in office. Such provisions are particularly
necessary to avoid the ‘capture’ of the regulator by the regulated institutions (the so-
called ‘revolving door’).21
A further safeguard of professional independence refers to the procedures for dismissal
of central bank officials. Grounds for dismissal should be clearly defined in the law,
including criminal offence or serious misconduct and permanent incapacity. Grounds for
dismissal should not include ‘displeasure’ with central bank actions, or criticism that the
Governor or other members of the governing bodies are not fulfilling their obligations.
The UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, criticised the ‘bad side effects’ of Bank of
England policies at the Conservative conference in October 2016, prompting Governor
Mark Carney to declare that he would not ‘take instruction’ from politicians on how to
do his job (Bruce & Hobson 2016).22 Janet Yellen, Fed chair, was criticised during the
campaign by the then Republican nominee (now President) Donald Trump (The
Economist 2016; Liesman 2016),23 leading some commentators to talk about the risk
of ‘politicisation of the Fed’ (Davies 2016).24 Marine Le Pen in France (who obtained
almost 11 million votes in the recent presidential elections on May 7th, 2017) vowed a
Brevolution in proximity ,^ promising more decision-making by French people and less
by global financial forces and multilateral institutions, while the FN manifesto had
called for the re-creation of the French franc (Stothard 2017).25
Attacks on central banks or central bankers exceeding their mandate or remit (or not
performing their mandate as expected by politicians) are often disguised attacks on
central bank independence (Münchau 2017a, b; The Economist 2016). 26 This can
undermine their credibility.
4 Interpreting the Legality of Central Bank Mandates and Activities
Interpreting whether a central bank abides by its mandate or exceeds its powers becomes
more difficult as the mandate gets fuzzier, broader and more complicated, as we
observed above. Since independent central banks have ‘room for manoeuvre’ within a
legal framework, this interpretation entails a delicate balance between how much to
‘decide by rule’ and how much to ‘leave to discretion’ (echoing Keynes’ words).
When an agency is created, power is not just given away, it is delegated. The ‘goal
constraint’ restricts ex ante what the central bank can and cannot do. Few central banks
have goal independence.
21 Lastra, ibid.
22 See http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-boe-idUKKBN12E0V0.
23 See http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-election-day/trump-said-janet-yellen-should-be-ashamed-
herself-so-will-n681581 quoting Trump as saying BI think she is very political and to a certain extent, I
think she should be ashamed of herself. Because it is not supposed to be that way .^ A recent FT editorial (16
June 2017) entitled BAn Independent Fed has never been more crucial^ cautions that ‘continual political
pressure on a central bank can damage its credibility’.
24 Davies (20 November 2016). The FTeditorial of 16 June 2017 entitled BAn independent Fed has never been more
crucial^ calls on President Trump to reappoint Yellen andmake it clear hewill not repeat his earlier criticism of the Fed.
25 https://www.ft.com/content/a5519f64-eaeb-11e6-930f-061b01e23655.
26 Münchau (2016) The End of the Era of Central Bank Independence, Financial Times, 13 November and
Münchau (2017) BThe Shadow Hanging over Central Bank Control^, Financial Times, 16 April.
See also The Economist, http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2016/11/unaccountable-technocrats-
or-convenient-scapegoats, 17 November 2016. Transparency International EU (2017).
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Former Federal Reserve System Chairman Ben Bernanke stated in 2009: ‘The
Federal Reserve has done, and will continue to do, everything possible within the
limits of its authority to assist in restoring our nation to financial stability’ while
President Draghi proclaimed in 2012 his clarion call that he would do ‘whatever it
takes’ … within the limits of our mandate… They were both aware of the need to act,
but to act within the rule of law. Legal provisions can - of course - be stretched…by art
of creative, imaginative or expansive interpretation (Draghi 2012).
How much freedom, room for manoeuvre, should central banks have? 27 What is the
scope of the delegation?
Independence in the context of central banking is not absolute, but relative.
Independence is freedom from political instruction on the one hand and from
financial markets on the other hand (the central bank acts in the public interest
while financial market participants are driven by private interests). This double
dimension goes hand in hand with their dual role as government’s bank and
bankers’ bank. However, what is considered to be ‘lack of dependence’ has
nuances across central banks, across jurisdictions, across time and across functions.
Between full independence and full dependence there is a gradation with various
degrees of operational autonomy (etymologically autonomy means the ability to
give norms to oneself) and control. The ECB and NCBs in the Eurosystem enjoy a
very high degree of independence, as CBI is protected and enshrined in a Treaty
(Article 130) and extends to all the tasks entrusted to the ESCB.28 The indepen-
dence of the Federal Reserve System is statutory and Congress could change the
law if it wished as former Presidential candidate Ron Paul suggested in BEnd the
Fed^ in 2009.29
Central banks have discretion within a framework of rules. The discretionary
element is essential for understanding some key central banking functions and policies,
notably their lender of last resort role (LOLR). The central bank’s discretion in its micro
27 Balls et al. (2016), above note 13, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/publications/awp/awp67,
refer to political independence as the absence of any possibility for politicians to influence central bank goals
or personnel and operational independence as the ability to choose an instrument to achieve inflation goals.
They claim that in order to protect their popular legitimacy, central banks in advanced economies can sacrifice
some political independence without undermining the operational independence that is important in both their
monetary policy and financial stability functions. See also Forder (2004).
28 Mersch (2017) in a speech at the ECB on BCentral Bank Independence revisited^ https://www.ecb.europa.
eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html argued that that the rationale of CBI, as set out in the Treaty
and interpreted by the CJEU, is to protect the ECB from political influence primarily in the conduct of
monetary policy and that micro and macro prudential supervision and crisis management are not protected by
the same high level of independence provided by the ECB under Article 130 TFEU. However, we disagree.
Neither the content of Article 130 nor the CJEU’s interpretation in the OLAF case (at a time when supervision
was still national) confine CBI, to monetary policy. CBI according to the text of Article 130, is applicable to all
the tasks conducted by the ESCB (BWhen exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties
conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute…^). And the CJEU in the OLAF case adopted a
functional interpretation of CBI, arguing that Art. 130 seeks to shield the ECB in the performance of its
tasks for all political pressure in order to enable it to effectively pursue the objectives attributed to its tasks.
Zilioli also contends that while the levels of independence and accountability for supervisors and central
banks are different, in the case of the ECB Article 130 covers the institution as such and therefore all its
activities. Furthermore, according to Article 282.3 TFEU independence is given to the ECB Bfrom the
performance of its functions^ and there is no distinction neither on the topic, nor on the source (primary or
secondary law). See Zilioli (2016).
29 Paul (2009).
Populism and Central Bank Independence
LOLR operations means that no credit institution can be sure of receiving such
extraordinary liquidity support. It is up to the central bank to make such a discretionary
decision, after determining case by case whether the entity requesting LOLR is sound
or unsound. The central bank ‘at its own initiative’ (Banking Communication 2013)30
should provide support to some entities and deny assistance to some others in accor-
dance with the Thornton and Bagehot principles, and increasingly in accordance with
published procedures (The Bank of England’s Sterling Monetary Framework 2015).31
Discretion of course should not mean arbitrariness. It means freedom to act (or not to
act) within a framework of rules; and the rules can be changed. Indeed, the discretion of
the Fed has been curtailed with regard to its lending to non-banks in the Dodd Frank
Act 2010.32 Some argue that the rules that frame the discretionary decision should be
further enhanced. However, it is important to preserve the flexibility to act swiftly in a
crisis. While bilateral LOLR (short-term lending) is discretionary, deposit insurance and
resolution proceedings are subject to greater legal constraints than LOLR and generally
have a longer time framework.
It is the discretionary element—the uncertainty about whether or not the emergency
liquidity assistance will be provided—that reduces the ‘moral hazard’ that is inherent in
any support operation.33 Some central banks have been (or remain) secretive when they
act as LOLR (‘constructive ambiguity’) to prevent moral hazard as well as the ‘stigma
effect’ (only the desperate go to the central bank). If accessing central bank credit is
perceived as signalling weakness - as was the case with Northern Rock in the UK in
September 2007 - instead of LOLR acting as a mechanism to maintain or restore
market credibility, news about a bilateral support operation can bring about the very
‘bank run’ that such support is trying to prevent.34
30 That the central bank stands ready to provide liquidity to sound entities does not mean that an entity should
‘expect’ as an entitlement to receive such assistance. The language ‘at its own initiative’ is included for
example in Commission Communication, 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of
banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’) 2013/C 216/01 paragraph 62.
31 In the USA, the Federal Reserve Act and its implementing Regulation A have provided a framework since
the inception of the Federal Reserve System. The main statutory provisions that deal with LOLR under the
Federal Reserve Act are: Section 10 (b) for lending to banks; Sections 13(3) and 13(13) for lending to non-
bank institutions; and Sections 12 (a) and 14 for open market operations. In the UK, a framework was
published in 2013 after the global financial crisis: the Sterling Monetary Framework, http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/sterlingoperations/redbook.aspx or ‘Red Book’ comprises: (1) the dis-
count window facility, which is bilateral on demand and firm specific; (2) the indexed long term repo, which is
‘market-wide’ and aimed at regular and predictable needs for liquid assets; and (3) the contingent term repo
facility, which is also ‘market wide’ but aimed at actual or prospective market wide stress of exceptional nature
against the full range of eligible collateral. There is also ELA outside the published framework.
32 Hal Scott criticises this restriction in the authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to provide
LOLR individual assistance to non-banks only under programmes of broad-based eligibility. See Scott (2015).
33 BDiscretion and conditionality on the Eurosystem’s non-objection [to ELA] are safeguards against moral
hazard^. See Praet (2016).
34 Hauser (2014). BThe stigma associated with being found to be using bilateral central bank support was a
significant concern in the UK during the crisis. A relatively modest usage of the Bank of England’s regular
overnight standing facilities in August 2007, not disclosed by the Bank but rapidly sniffed out by a zealous
media, led to febrile speculation about the underlying cause. A month later, the leak of the Bank’s ELA to
Northern Rock led to a retail run on the bank which had to be stemmed through a blanket government deposit
guarantee. (…) What is profoundly clear, however, is that banks prefer, wherever possible, to make use of
market-wide rather than bilateral facilities, allowing them to say, BWe’re all in this together .^ That is why,
across the globe, so much of the heavy lifting in the crisis was done through multilateral operations, in which
the total amount provided, and the terms, were often publicly disclosed.^
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Accountability is not simply an ‘add-on’ to justify independence. Hence the
term ‘accountable independence’. 35 Accountability - ex ante and ex post - is a
constitutive part of the design of an independent agency in a democratic system,
whose aim is to bring back the central bank to the system of checks and balances,
(trias politica).
[I]ndependence is only one side of the coin, for in a democratic community
accountability is also necessary. Such accountability should be diversified,
dispersed through the three branches of the state, through institutions with
differing obligations to the electorate hereby granting the democratic legit-
imacy that an independent central bank would otherwise lack. This institu-
tional articulation of accountability should be complemented by other forms
of accountability, namely public support, disclosure and performance con-
trol (…). The optimal trade-off between independence and accountability
varies from country to country.36
Accountability does not necessarily politicize a central bank, rather it means
that the central bank should provide a justification of its actions. The institu-
tional design of accountable independence is a balancing act. Too much
independence leads to an undesirable state within the state. Too much account-
ability threatens the effectiveness of independence. When Parliament is dom-
inated by the executive branch of government or when parliamentary account-
ability is limited (for example the ‘monetary dialogue’ in the European Par-
liament) we must rely also on other mechanisms to hold the central bank to
account.
A central bank, lest we forget, is both an agency and a bank37 and, thus, it needs a
special accountability regime.
An accountable central bank should be judged for the reasonableness of its
actions, by Parliament, by the executive, by the competent Courts of Justice and
by the public. While the debate on accountability has focused primarily on
parliamentary scrutiny, performance control and transparency, in the ensuing
section we focus on judicial review.
35 Lastra (1992); Lastra (1996); Amtenbrink and Lastra (2008).
36 Lastra, above note 3, p. 93. BAny recent discussion of accountability often includes a reference to
transparency and vice versa. This poses the question of the relationship between the two concepts.
Accountability is an obligation to give account of, explain, and justify one’s actions, while transparency is
the degree to which information on such actions is available. The provision of information is clearly an
element of accountability. But accountability is not merely about giving information. It must involve
defending the action, policy, or decision for which the accountable is being held to account. The provision
of information (transparency) is hardly ever a neutral account of what happened or of what is happening;
hence the need for an explanation or justification of the agency’s actions or decisions (accountability).^
A recent report on the independence and accountability of the ECB recommends increasing its transparency.
See https://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TI-EU_ECB_Report_DIGITAL.pdf.
37 Lastra, above note 3, chapter 2.
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5 Judicial Review of Central Bank Actions and Decisions
The judicial review of administrative actions to prevent an arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of discretionary authority is an important element of the rule of law.38
Up until the global financial crisis, courts dealt sparsely with central banking actions and
decisions.39 However, the situation has changed in the last decade on this side of theAtlantic.
In the UK, the Northern Rock case led to a lively debate about discretion, financial stability
and moral hazard with regard to the LOLR of the Bank of England.40 In the EU, with the
Pringle case41 and the Gauweiler case,42 the role of the CJEU in the formation of economic
and monetary policy has become the subject of legal and political debate. Before Pringle the
only twomaterial ECJ decisions related to EMUwere the 2003OLAF case43 which clarified
the status and independence of the ECB44 and the 2004 judgment on the Stability and
Growth Pact.
When reviewing central bank policies or decisions to assess whether or not a central
bank has exceeded its powers, the competent Courts (in the case of the ECB only the
Court of Justice of the European Union is competent) may exercise judicial restraint –
deferring to central bank discretion and expertise – or more robust judicial control. This
exercise will vary depending upon which central bank function is at stake, since the
contours of discretionary powers are different when it comes to monetary policy than
when it comes to banking supervision.45 The latter relies on a much more extensive and
detailed legal framework than the former. And while central bank accountability with
regard to monetary policy has been typically ‘explanatory’ (unless the law of the central
bank is amended or the governor is removed from office, there is little room for
38 The ‘rules versus discretion’ debate has a long-standing tradition in administrative law. Judicial review of
administrative acts is a requirement of a rule of law based system. There are procedural elements that
determine the legality of an administrative act, such as the competence of the entity that issues the act or
the procedure to prepare and approve such act, and the existence of a public interest. The more difficult issue is
the standard of review judges should apply when they conclude that the administrative act they are reviewing
is not legal or legitimate and must therefore be changed or substituted.
39 In the USA, Conti-Brown (2016) notes how Bthere’s no mechanism provided by statute or judicial decision
to review Fed actions in court.^ (Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York 1929; Scism 2014) (BIt would
be an unthinkable burden upon any banking system if its open market sales and discount rates were to be
subject to judicial review. Indeed, the correction of discount rates by judicial decree seems almost grotesque,
when we remember that conditions in the money market often change from hour to hour, and the disease
would ordinarily be over long before a judicial diagnosis could be made.^). Conti Brown references the
decision re AIG in footnote 17 of chapter 4, though that was about the rescue package offered to AIG rather
than monetary policy (https://www.wsj.com/articles/trial-in-40-billion-lawsuit-against-aig-bailout-begins-
1412015133). See also Zaring (2015).
40 See SRM Global Master Fund LP v The Commissioners of HM Treasury [2009] EWCA Civ 788 and
[2009] EWHC 227 (Admin).
41 C-370/12 Pringle v Government of Ireland [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:756.
42 Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others vs Deutscher Bundestag [2014] OJ C129/11.
43 C- 11/00 Commission of the European Communities v European Central Bank [2003] ECR 1–07147. This
case is referred to as ‘the OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office) case’.
44 Mersch, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html above note 28.
45 Macro-prudential supervision – in the pursuit of financial stability – sits between monetary policy and
micro-prudential supervision. In the USA, the designation of a non-bank financial institution as subject to
supervision by the Financial Stability Oversight Council is reviewable. The prospective Choice Act, which has
now gone through the House of Representatives, which would remove that power altogether. 12 U.S.C. §
5323(b). See Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68366 (D.D.C. 2016)
(appeal pending).
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granting redress with regard to monetary policy decisions), the accountability of the
central bank (or other supervisory agencies) in the field of prudential supervision is
sometimes ‘explanatory’ and sometimes ‘amendatory’. The liability of supervisory
authorities for loss caused by the inadequate supervision of banks46 has been discussed
in recent years in the context of the BCCI litigation (Lloyd’s Rep. Bank 2000; Tait
2006)47 and the Peter Paul case.48
Central bank discretion (a key component of independence) is the freedom to act
within the limits of a legal framework. Judicial review does not extend to the ‘content
of the decision’ (the aim of the Court is not to supplant or replace the decision taken or
to second guess what central banks should have done), but it does extend to the
parameters and legal framework that surround such decision in order to determine
whether or not the central bank mandate has been exceeded.49
Discretion in the context of monetary policy means inter alia that the central bank can
choosewhichevermonetary policy instrument it deems appropriate in the pursuit of the goal;
discretion also means that the central bank can define what a generic goal such as price
stability actually means. The content of such discretionary decision is not reviewable.
Discretion in the context of LOLR is essential for the effectiveness of this function as we
discussed above, though such emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) still needs to be
provided within the contours of rule-based framework. For example, discretion in the
provision of ELA in the Eurosystem means that National Central Banks (NCBs) acting as
LOLR in bilateral lending operations (market liquidity assistance via open market opera-
tions is the responsibility of the ECB) can choose to provide assistance, or not, to a credit
institution (at their own risk and liability), but they must act in accordance with the Treaty
provisions (notably Article 123 on the prohibition of monetary financing, Article 127 with
regard to the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem and Articles 130–131 with regard to
the principle of central bank independence), the ECB Emergency liquidity assistance
(ELA) procedures (European Central Bank ELAprocedures 2017)50 and EU state aid rules.
During the twin financial and sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone, the ECB
expanded its toolkit of monetary policy instruments into ‘unconventional measures.’
One of those measures was the Outright Monetary Transactions programme (which
was never activated). The OMT programme was announced in a press release
46 Andenas (2001). See also Andenas, Fairgrieve (2000).
47 The case against the Bank of England [Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank
of England (No. 3) [2000] 2 W.L.R. 1220; [2000] 3 All E.R. 1; [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank. 235, HL was
abandoned on 2 November 2005, when BCCI liquidators Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu dropped their claim
[against the Bank of England], after receiving a legal ruling that it would not be in the best interests of BCCI’s
creditors to continue with the lawsuit. See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5ddffe2a-f68a-11da-b09f-0000779
e2340.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4o2zbcMFL.
48 C-222/02, Peter Paul and Others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [2004] ECR I-(12.10.2004).
49 The CJEU ‘has developed a fairly consistent standard of judicial review of crisis-related measures (…). It
comprises a close scrutiny of the purposes of a mandate or competence, a check whether the instruments
deployed serve the mandate, and an analysis whether the effects are proportionate to the objectives’. See
Goldmann (2016).
50 The ECB ELA procedures – in accordance with Article 14.4 ESCB Statute – were first published in 2013
and revised in 2014, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/201402_elaprocedures.en.pdf.
A revised version of the ELA procedures, adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB on 17 May 2017
were published on 19 June 2017 and they are available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/
Agreement_on_emergency_liquidity_assistance_20170517.en.pdf.
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published by the ECB on 6 September 2012 in response to severe financial market
tensions in the summer of 2012 (European Central Bank, Technical features of Outright
Monetary 2012).51 The legality of OMT was challenged by some German citizens
(Gauweiler and others) in the German Federal Constitutional Court,
Bundesverfassungsgericht, which referred the case to the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJUE) for a preliminary ruling to determine whether the ECB had
exceeded its mandate, acting ultra vires, with this announcement.
The CJEU made its final ruling in June 2015, declaring the conditional OMT
programme to be legal, since it ‘does not exceed the powers of the ECB in relation
to monetary policy and does not contravene the prohibition of monetary financing of
EU nations’.52 The CJEU focused on the objectives of monetary policy rather than the
effects of the measures under review.53
A key feature in the case is the deference to the broad discretion of the ECB. As
Advocate General Cruz Villalón stated in his Opinion:
The ECB must accordingly be afforded a broad discretion for the purpose of
framing and implementing the Union’s monetary policy. The Courts, when
reviewing the ECB’s activity, must therefore avoid the risk of supplanting the
Bank, by venturing into a highly technical terrain in which it is necessary to have
an expertise and experience which, according to the Treaties, devolves solely
upon the ECB. Therefore, the intensity of judicial review of the ECB’s activity, its
mandatory nature aside, must be characterised by a considerable degree of
caution (Opinion of Advocate General (AG) 2015).54
The risk of ‘supplanting the Bank’ justifies the ‘degree of caution’ that should charac-
terize the intensity of judicial review.55 BJudges should not overstep the limits of their
competences in order to enforce the limits of other actors’ competences.^56 However,
the deference to the ECB’s ‘broad discretion’ on the basis of the latter’s experience and
technical expertise strengthens the case for expertise and adequate preparation of the
judges that will assess those complex issues. This happens in other areas of economic
regulation. Judicial activism has become the norm in the field of EU competition policy.
51 European Central Bank, Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions (6 September 2012)
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html.
52 Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others vs Deutscher Bundestag [2014] OJ C129/11. The Court also
concluded the OMT did not infringe the principle of proportionality.
53 Tridimas, Xanthoulis (2016): BThe emphasis on the objectives rather than the effects of a measure as the
determining factor for deciding whether it falls within monetary or economic policy, coupled with a low
standard of review, grants the author of the measure enormous discretion^.
54 Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Cruz Villalón in the OMTcase, delivered on 14 January 2015 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62014CC0062, paragraph 111. See also paragraph
109. According to Tridimas, Xanthoulis, above note 53, p. 31: BThis is a judgment of institutional
empowerment (…). The Court was deferential and did not apply a stricter standard of scrutiny.^
55 The case against an undesirable ‘government of judges’ is in line with the separation of powers (trias
politica) to which we referred above. In a different context, see inter alia Davis (1987).
56 Goldmann (2014). Goldmann advocates judicial review on the basis of ‘rationality checks’ which in his
view stand in between ‘full judicial review’ and ‘full discretion’. He also refers to the fact that while the
perspective of the Judiciary is ‘retrospective’, monetary policy involves ‘forward-looking’ estimates (p. 268).
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US Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has argued that it is not possible to
understand and evaluate what agencies do without having some sense of the regulatory
policy as well.57 The need for specific expertise when it comes to the adjudication of
complex financial and monetary matters is a relevant issue not only for the CJEU but
also, for example, for the UK Supreme Court. If judicial restraint in monetary matters is
advocated on the basis of [limited] technical expertise and qualifications of the judges
adjudicating such matters,58 the counter-argument to not ‘being equipped’ is to actually
equip judges (European Central Bank 2017).59
Given the specificity and complexity of monetary policy and other central
banking functions (and the added difficulty in the EU context of determining
whether a measure is of monetary policy – an exclusive competence of the Union
– or economic policy60) and considering that only the CJEU can judge the ECB
(Article 35 ESCB Statute), the need for competence and expertise in the exercise
of judicial review could be served by the establishment of a specialised chamber
within the CJEU to deal with these issues. Having dedicated specialised judges
with expertise in financial and monetary matters when adjudicating cases related
to the ECB would enhance the legal framework of ECB accountability in the light
of the significantly expanded mandate of the ECB.
6 Concluding Observations
The consensus that surrounded the granting of central bank independence in the pursuit of
a ‘price stability oriented’ monetary policy has been challenged in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis, in the light of the rise of populism on the one hand and the
expanded mandates of central banks on the other hand. After considering the economic
case for independence and the three Ds (distributional, directional and duration effects),
the paper examined three different dimensions in the debate of how the rise in populism -
or simply general discontent with the status quo - affects central bank independence.
Finally, the paper examined how to interpret the legality of central bank mandates, and
whether or not central banks have exceeded their powers. This analysis led us in turn to
consider accountability and, in particular, the judicial review of central bank actions and
decisions. It is important to have in place adequate mechanisms to ‘guard the guardians’ of
monetary and financial stability.
57 Caplan (2017).
58 See e.g. Goldmann, above note 56, p. 268 and p. 271.
59 In the EU context, a specialized court could be created to deal with matters related to the ECB according to
Article 257 TFEU and Article 62c of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
In her comments to our paper Christina Skinner writes: ‘On the issue of specialist courts, a slight variation on
your idea: when I was clerking in the Southern District of New York, the judges had pioneered an internal pilot
program in which certain judges would self-specialize, by taking on all of one certain type of technical case.
For example, one or two judges might take all of the patent cases; another the terrorist sentencing cases. So
that could be one way to do it, if you did not want to go all the way to specialist courts.’
60 Monetary policy is an exclusive EU competence in accordance with Article 3(1)(c) TFEU while economic
policy is coordinated at the EU level (positive integration in accordance with Article 119 TFEU and negative
integration in terms of the prohibitions applicable to Member States of the eurozone) but the competence
remains at the national level. See Lastra, above note 3, Chapters 7 and 8.
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